On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences by Darley, John M.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 13
Issue 1
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES III:
Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research and
Forensic Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
Article 10
2005
On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates
by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences
John M. Darley
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J. L. & Pol'y (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol13/iss1/10
DARLEY MACROED FINAL 2-23-05.DOC 3/7/2005 6:20 PM 
 
189 
ON THE UNLIKELY PROSPECT OF 
REDUCING CRIME RATES BY INCREASING 
THE SEVERITY OF PRISON SENTENCES      
John M. Darley∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
For the last several decades, criminal justice practitioners in the 
United States have sought to reduce crime rates and deter crime by 
mandating increases in the severity of punishments imposed on 
those who commit crimes. Section I of this article will review the 
ways in which increased sentences and other criminal justice 
practices have led to a remarkable increase in the number of people 
held in prisons. Since the standard punishment for crime is a prison 
sentence, severity is increased by increasing the duration of the 
prison sentence. Section II will briefly summarize the evidence that 
provides the basis for increased duration sentences and will 
suggest that increases in sentences have rarely, if ever, produced 
the desired reduction in crime rates—a conclusion that is now 
widely shared among criminal justice system researchers. Section 
III will employ a novel approach that draws on psychological 
research to explain why severity-increasing deterrence measures 
are ineffective. Further, it argues that it is not the case that further 
escalations of sentence length will eventually produce deterrent 
effects. Section IV discusses the circumstances in which deterrence 
can be achieved successfully. Empirically, it appears to be possible 
when the perceived probability that a particular crime will be 
                                                          
 ∗ Warren Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton 
University. The author is grateful to Paul Robinson, who has educated him in 
many aspects of the criminal justice system, and with whom the author has 
explored the tensions between the system and citizens’ sense of justice. 
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detected is high. Section V turns in a new direction, asking 
whether citizens actually demand increased sentence severity. This 
section will review evidence suggesting that citizens’ perspectives 
on criminal justice do not create political demand for severe 
sentences and would allow for a criminal justice system that does 
not impose such sentences. 
I. THE INCARCERATION STATISTICS 
A. The Number of People Incarcerated 
The number of citizens incarcerated in prisons and jails in the 
United States has increased at a startling rate. One frequently 
quoted statistic tells us that there were fewer than 200,000 inmates 
in our national prisons in 1971, and now there are over 2,000,000, 
more than a ten-fold increase in the course of about three decades.1 
What accounts for this result? Some of the increase, but not much, 
can be attributed to population growth. From the end of World War 
II to the early 1970s, the number of prison inmates per 100,000 
people in the population fluctuated in what Professor Elliot Curry 
refers to as a “narrow band” of between 93 and 119; by 1996, this 
number reached 427 per 100,000 citizens.2 Thus, in the United 
States, we are incarcerating about four times as many persons 
(corrected for population growth) as we previously were. Second, 
we have approximately tripled the length of the prison sentence for 
various crimes, so we are keeping the average convict in prison for 
a considerably longer duration. Third, in the United States, we 
have expanded criminal definitions. The past three decades 
witnessed “the war on drugs,” which resulted in the criminalization 
of conduct that previously had not been defined as criminal. For 
instance, in our attempts to “stamp out drug dealing” in the United 
                                                          
1 Lauren E. Glaze & Seri Palla, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2003 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Washington, D.C., July 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/abstract/ppus03.htm. This series of publications is widely used as a 
source for statistics on incarcerated individuals. 
2 ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 12-13 (1998). 
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States, we imputed an intent to sell drugs to persons in possession 
of rather minor quantities of drugs and gave these “dealers” 
lengthier sentences. 
Many would identify these three factors as major causes of the 
dramatic rise in incarceration, but a fourth factor may also have a 
contributing influence. Perhaps influenced by the “law and 
economics movement” and its focus on human motivation, we look 
on criminal laws as largely designed to deter conduct that the state 
wishes to deter. Thus, if conduct falls into this category, it is often 
defined as criminal. This is a much more expansive definition of 
crime than the alternate one, which is the commission of an act that 
society regards as morally wrong. As Professor John Coffee notes, 
this more expansive definition has led to the criminalization of 
many activities that were previously only considered regulatory 
offenses.3 How many of these newly defined “crimes” are 
punished by prison terms rather than by fines remains to be 
determined, but the number may contribute to the increase in the 
prison population. 
B. The Social Costs 
1. Dollar Costs 
The most obvious cost of an increase in the prison population 
is the dollar cost of housing prisoners in moderately secure prisons 
and staffing prisons with the custodial and other personnel needed 
to provide the rather minimal conditions that we allow prisoners. 
The cost of a year in prison has been accurately estimated to be 
quite close to a year in college. The funds for prisons come mainly 
from discretionary state budgets and, thus, they compete with other 
possible draws on these budgets, such as medical and educational 
payments for citizens. One notices the irony of, for instance, 
decreasing funds to community colleges—institutions that 
                                                          
3 John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on 
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
193, 201-8 (1991). 
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contribute to citizens obtaining decent jobs—while increasing 
funds for the incarceration of citizens who turn to illegal activities 
because they lack the qualifications for decent jobs. 
2. Creating Constituencies 
Other consequences of increasing prison terms have social 
science implications. One consequence is that, particularly during 
periods of high structural unemployment, large prison construction 
programs create communities that actually compete to house new 
prison construction. Such projects not only create construction 
jobs, but also long-term jobs for prison guards and prison staffs 
that can tip a small community toward survival. In an era of 
privatization, large companies have divisions that specialize in 
running private, for-profit prisons. This creates certain dangers 
that, while not inevitable, are undoubtedly serious. 
For instance, regardless of whether the prisons are public or 
private, it is likely that the majority of prison personnel will come 
to adopt a social control ideology, which regards any acts of 
violence that guards inflict on prisoners as required for the control 
of dangerously deviant prisoners. To control these abusive 
practices, states must establish a regime of surveillance and 
supervision over guard behavior that is costly if done well, and 
conducive to bad treatment of prisoners if done poorly or 
sporadically. Thus, although a new prison might be welcome in a 
struggling community, it will present some subtle, long-term 
problems for the community as community members are socialized 
into the criminal control ideology. 
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3. Prisonization.4 
Spending significant time in prison changes a person in several 
ways, generally not for the better. Even with long sentences, most 
prisoners eventually return to society, bringing with them the 
dangers associated with prisonization. One of the most obvious 
dangers is the public health threat caused by the increased 
likelihood of the prisoner having contracted AIDS or drug-resistant 
tuberculosis and transmitting these diseases to the general 
population. It is also the case that a person in prison for a longer 
period of time loses job skills. That, coupled with the stigma of 
being a criminal, makes finding a job upon release less likely. 
Additionally, one often finds ties to family and friends weakened, 
replaced by a reliance on associations with past prisoners for 
friendship. All of these factors impose costs on society that extend 
beyond the criminal’s prison term.5 
II. THE EFFICACY OF DETERRENCE: EMPIRICAL REVIEWS 
In the recent past and continuing through the present, crime 
prevention policy in the United States has been driven by attempts 
to produce deterrence by providing increasingly severe prison 
sentences for crimes.6 Evidence is emerging that, apart from being 
extremely costly, the lengthening of sentences is also ineffective. 
This article does not refute the notion that citizens’ knowledge of 
                                                          
4 In 1940, Donald Clemmer brought the study of assimilation of norms to 
the prison setting. Drawing on the scholarly tradition that was at the forefront of 
American Sociology during the early 20th century, he was the first scholar to 
write about the prison as a functional whole. Clemmer’s intensive study was 
based on his experiences as a correctional officer at Menard Penitentiary, a 
2,300 person prison for men in Illinois. Clemmer described the unique ways that 
inmates assimilate to the social world of the prison. He termed this process 
“prisonization.” DONALD CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY (Rinehart & 
Company 1958) (1940). 
5 Richard Lippke, Crime Reduction and the Length of Prison Sentences, 24 
L. & POL’Y 17, 28-29 (2002). 
6 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 949, 949-1000, Section II 956-76. 
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the array of penalties the criminal justice system has at its disposal 
serves as a general deterrent force on those contemplating crime. 
Nor does this article deny that certain manipulations relevant to the 
threat of prison, such as an active and publicized police presence, 
can sharply reduce criminal conduct. It does assert, however, that 
increasing the duration of the mandated prison sentence for a type 
of crime generally will not result in a decrease in the rate of that 
crime. 
The studies considered here are called “aggregated effect 
studies.” These studies are generally termed “naturally occurring 
experiments,” in which some reduction or, more commonly, 
increase in the severity of sentence for a particular crime occurs in 
one state, but not in an adjacent state. If severity of sentence 
matters, then the decrease or increase in severity in the state that 
changed severity should cause a new increase or decrease in the 
rate of that crime following the implementation of the change. The 
current rate of the crime in a comparable state provides an estimate 
of what the rate of crime in the observed state “should have been” 
in the time period in question. A variant of this design compares 
the rate of crime in the one state both before and after the severity 
change. In this model, however, the analysis is complicated by 
changes in crime rates that are linked to variables such as changes 
in the economy in the years in question. Inevitably, these studies 
are difficult to perform and the results produced are always open to 
alternative explanations. 
Two recent reviews analyze the findings of these aggregated 
effect studies. The chronologically earlier one7 is a commissioned 
report that is quite circumspect in its conclusions, asserting only 
that “none of the associations [between severity and rate] is of 
sufficient magnitude to achieve statistical significance,” a sort of 
Scottish “not proven” verdict. The later report8 is blunter. It 
reviews a number of sentence severity and crime rate studies, 
                                                          
7 ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE 
SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 26 (1999) (discussing the 
methodological problems of aggregated effect studies). 
8 Anthony Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH, 143-95 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003). 
DARLEY MACROED FINAL 2-23-05.DOC 3/7/2005 6:20 PM 
 DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY 195 
including ones made possible by “three strikes” laws, and subjects 
them to careful methodological scrutiny. The report asserts that we 
should accept the fact that there are no general demonstrations of 
crime rate reductions achieved by alterations in sentence severity 
that are “within the [severity] limits that are plausible in [w]estern 
[s]ocieties.”9 Given the remarkable increases in sentence severity 
found “plausible” in the United States in the past decade, it is 
unlikely that the changes in severity have been too anemic to 
produce rate reduction effects. Pending new studies that overturn 
this conclusion, it seems that increasing the severity of sentences is 
not reducing the rate of crimes. 
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS FOR THE LACK OF DETERRENT 
EFFECT 
Those who support increasing the severity of sentences do so in 
order to attempt to affect the actions of individuals contemplating 
the commission of crimes. Influenced by discoveries in the field of 
judgment and decision making, psychologists have increasingly 
accepted the conclusion that people do not make decisions based 
on elements that are objectively relevant to their decisions. Instead, 
they form mental representations of those elements, which 
constitute the inputs to their decisions. Since these mental 
representations are often seriously incongruent with the true state 
of affairs, the resulting decisions are often similarly incongruent 
with what one thinks of as rational. 
A. Are Future Possibilities of Punishment Represented at All 
in the Criminal’s Decision? 
This question may seem surprising, but those who have had 
experience with criminals actually raise it.10 One well-supported 
theory of criminal behavior holds that many crimes are committed 
by persons with somewhat disordered personalities who are 
                                                          
9 Id. at 195. 
10 MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF 
CRIME (1990). 
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characterized by a predilection for impulsive behavior. Their 
prototypic crime is to rob a house after kicking in the door on their 
way home from someplace where they have been for unrelated 
reasons. These are the sorts of crimes that become semi-humorous 
reports in newspapers. Like the bank robber who passes his 
demand for money on material that reveals his identity, prison 
inmates report that they were not thinking of the possibility of 
prison when they committed their offense.11 Professor Anderson, 
who conducted interviews of prison inmates, concluded: 
The findings suggest that 76 percent of active criminals and 
89 percent of the most violent criminals either perceive no 
risk of apprehension or are incognizant of the likely 
punishments for their crimes.12 
If this is so, the sentence for a particular crime does not act as a 
deterrent in the mind of the potential criminal. 
1. Impairment by Drugs and Alcohol 
Impulsive crimes are often committed by persons on their way 
home from a bar or a drug den. Thus, many crimes are committed 
by those under the influence of some substance that reduces the 
impact of long-term consequences on decision making. Hence, the 
decisionmaker is more likely to act impulsively.  
The Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse estimated the 
role of alcohol and drugs in the commission of crimes.13 According 
to its report, substance abuse and addiction have shaped the 
criminal histories of 80 percent of prisoners today: eighty-one 
percent of the 1,076,625 state inmates, 80 percent of the 105,544 
federal inmates and 77 percent of the 518,492 local jail inmates 
who violated drug or alcohol laws, were high at the time they 
committed their crimes, stole property to buy drugs, or have a 
history of drug and alcohol abuse and addiction—or share some 
                                                          
11 David Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the 
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 302-4 (2002). 
     12 Id. 
13 THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S 
PRISON POPULATION (Jan. 1998). 
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combination of these characteristics.14 
Included in these startlingly high percentages are some 
offenders who cannot be assumed to have been under the influence 
of drugs when they violated drug laws by, for instance, selling 
illegal drugs to drug users while not being users themselves. 
Others also might not have been under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol at the time they decided to commit a crime, even though 
they have a “history of alcohol abuse and addiction.” Still, the 
degree to which drugs, alcohol, and crime are intertwined is 
obviously great. 
2. Gangs of Young Men 
Deterrence calculations are particularly unlikely to be made by 
a young man whose peers exert a bad influence on him. Gangs 
often exert pressure on their members to assume the role of a 
daring doer of adventurous bad deeds. In this social surrounding, 
ordinarily sensible individuals accept this role and do things they 
would rarely choose to do in other surroundings. A recently 
developed theory in social psychology, social identity theory,15 
asserts that individuals in groups with which they identify become 
the prototypical group member. Hence, they willingly become 
violent or commit crimes if that is the prevailing pattern of the 
group. When the interests of the gang dominate a member’s state 
of mind, considerations of prison sentences in the distant future are 
not likely to have much influence in shaping decisions. 
In a recent thesis entitled “In With a Bad Crowd: An Analysis 
of Criminal Decision Making in Small Groups,” Professor 
Hochstetler reports the results of his numerous interviews with 
incarcerated criminals. 16 He describes the way in which vague 
suggestions of possible crimes quickly escalate in crime-prone 
                                                          
14 Id. at 1-2. 
15 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 1-
2 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990). 
16 Andrew Lee Hochstetler, In With a Bad Crowd: An Analysis of Criminal 
Decision Making in Small Groups (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville) (on file with 
author). 
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groups of men who hang out together. In one case, a jailed 
interviewee reported that he actually disagreed with the robbery 
plans, but “one thing lead to another until there we was.”17 The 
move toward the commission of the crime is thus best described as 
a “group process,” rather than the product of an individual, 
separate decision. 
Not surprisingly, alcohol and drugs often contribute to short-
sighted thinking that results in spontaneous and generally ill-
conceived criminal activities. One interviewee recounted a 
scenario that occurred while he was driving around with others: 
They were talking about robbing a place and we were high 
on crack. We wanted another rock. We pulled into a 
number of places [to rob] and nobody would do it . . . I 
finally said ‘alright by god pull in the next place you see.’18 
The group subsequently pulled in and he completed the robbery.19 
One drunken group even set out to “do” a crime, but left some 
of its members behind. The members left behind admitted that the 
only reason they did not participate in the crime committed by 
their peers was that they had been too drunk to “make it to the 
car.”20 
In summary, for many crimes, a prevention strategy that relies 
on potential perpetrators to mentally weigh the consequences of 
conviction and punishment simply does not comport with the 
evidence of the actual “thought” process of convicted criminals. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the image of the impulse-
driven, drunk, or drugged, young male actor fits all crimes, 
although, given the statistics cited above, it does fit many of them. 
Indeed, some crimes, such as embezzlement or white-collar 
crimes, seem to imply a much more deliberative thought process 
on the part of potential perpetrators. It is hoped that the existence 
of severe prison sanctions will exert a real deterrent effect on 
potential perpetrators of these crimes. 
                                                          
17 Id. at 175. 
18 Id. at 178. 
19 Id. at 178. 
20 Id. at 155. 
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B. “Deliberately Committed” Crimes 
Examining the types of crimes that are “deliberately 
committed” provides an opportunity to re-examine the questions 
with which this article began: How are deterrence considerations 
mentally represented for potential criminals and how do these 
considerations influence the decision to commit a crime? 
1. The Unnoticed Transition into Crime 
An individual who commits a crime often does not 
psychologically understand his first actions to be criminal. This is 
especially true for perpetrators of corporate crimes. In the case of 
an organization that commits what is called “improper revenue 
recognition,” the criminal activity often begins with a sympathetic 
interpretation of a complex rule about exactly when a transaction is 
sufficiently complete to be counted as revenue in a particular 
quarter. The interpretation is “sympathetic” in that it enables the 
organization to declare revenue in order to meet earning targets. At 
this point, no crime has been committed, but a problem and a 
pattern now exist. The problem is twofold. First, next quarter’s 
profits have been “robbed” to pad this quarter. Second, the 
organization might be in even greater need of recognizing 
increased revenue in three months. The organization has also 
established a pattern of rule bending that makes it harder to resist 
bending the rules in the future. In one case, for example, a 
company that manufactured hard drives booked as sales shipments 
of bricks that were kept in a warehouse that the company had 
rented for that purpose. Not surprisingly, this action had been 
preceded by a long series of marginally ethical end-of-quarter 
actions. 
This is a psychologically interesting process. It is not quite the 
case that the decision to commit a crime was deliberative. Rather, 
the person or group acted impulsively in a way that, at the time, 
did not appear to be wrong. In retrospect, however, those initial 
questionable actions set off a chain of conduct that ultimately 
crossed the line into criminal behavior. 
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2. Ethical Fading 
Increasingly, psychologists believe that people make decisions 
that conventional wisdom suggests have ethical components 
without representing those components in their thinking. 
Individuals often are not aware of the ethical components of the 
decisions they make, in part because they think of themselves as 
inherently ethical actors. According to Professors Tenbrunsel and 
Messick, “[i]ndividuals do not ‘see’ the moral components of an 
ethical decision, not so much because they are morally uneducated, 
but because psychological processes fade the ‘ethics’ from an 
ethical dilemma.”21 “Ethical fading” is their term for the process 
“by which the moral colors of an ethical decision fade into the 
bleached hues that are void of moral implications.”22 
3. Hyperbolic Discounting 
Finally, suppose that some concept of the abstract possibility of 
punishment is represented in the mental processing of an 
individual. As Jeremy Bentham noted, the deterrent weight of 
punishment is a complex function of the severity of the 
punishment, the probability of receiving the punishment, and, 
finally, the anticipated delay between the act and the receipt of the 
punishment. Psychological research in the last decades has 
demonstrated that the anticipation of rewards and punishments in 
the future has startlingly little effect on human behavior when 
compared to rewards and punishments in the present. To a drug 
addict, the threat of a future prison sentence is less of a concern 
when compared to the desire for the “rock” of cocaine that the 
robbery will pay for. Other governmental regimes, realizing this, 
have traded off due process concerns for regimes of summary 
punishment—immediate executions of those caught in the process 
of (what might or might not be) a crime. It is to the credit of our 
legislatures that they generally have not chosen this option. But the 
                                                          
21 Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading and the Role of 
Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004). 
22 Id. 
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cost of that choice is this: the threat of punishment is greatly 
attenuated by being mentally represented as taking place far in the 
future.23 
C. Amplifying Severity by Word of Mouth Effects 
Once they are released from prison, criminals often return to 
the communities from which they came. These communities are 
often poor and inhabited by minorities, and are those from which 
new criminals are “expected” to emerge. The hope of some 
policymakers may be that returning criminals will convey the 
punitive severity of long prison sentences to their communities, 
thus motivating potential criminals to avoid beginning their 
criminal careers. Psychologists are skeptical about whether this 
indirect effect of long duration sentences is plausible for two 
related reasons. 
First, hedonic adaptation, which is the general tendency for an 
experience that is sustained over time to decline in its hedonic 
intensity, lessens the effect of a longer sentence. Experiences that 
are in some sense objectively constant in intensity are registered by 
the individuals experiencing them as less intense over time. For 
example, moving to California is initially experienced as 
producing the pleasure that California’s fine climate generates, but, 
over time, the pleasure produced by yet another beautiful day palls. 
The same is true of negatively experienced states. Researchers 
have pointed out a pattern of hedonic adaptation by prisoners 
during their sentences. Even if the day-to-day circumstances of 
prison are equally bad, one adapts to them and experiences them as 
less negative. The prisoner’s day-to-day circumstances may 
actually improve in quality, for instance, if he receives a prison 
“job” that provides some amenities or graduates to a regime of 
lowered security and confinement.24 
                                                          
23 Marjon van der Pol & John Cairns, A Comparison of the Discounted 
Utility Model and Hyperbolic Discounting Models in the Case of Social and 
Private Intertemporal Preferences for Health, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 79, 
93 (2002). 
24 Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Discounting, in WELL 
BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 303-29 (Daniel 
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The second startling reason why word of mouth does not 
produce deterrent effects is the phenomenon of “duration neglect.” 
With regard to the aversiveness of an event that persists over time, 
the duration of the event creates only a very weak representation of 
the experience in the person’s memory. The recollection is 
determined by the “peaks” in aversiveness, for example, the 
sharpest pains experienced by the individual as well as the pain 
experienced at the end of the experience. This phenomenon is 
unsettling for those who seek to manipulate aversiveness by 
increasing sentence duration. Duration neglect suggests that 
sentence duration is an ineffective means of increasing the 
recollected aversiveness of a prison sentence. The peak end rule, 
coupled with hedonic adaptation causing the aversiveness 
experienced at the end of the sentence to be low, suggests that 
longer sentences may be experienced as less aversive than shorter 
ones, in which less adaptation takes place. 
One purpose of increasing sentence durations is to deter the 
person serving the sentence from ever again taking the risk of 
committing a crime because of the long misery of his prison term. 
But if the research reviewed above is correct, duration increases 
will not have this effect because they do not do much to increase 
the aversiveness of remembered prison experience. The second 
possible goal of long prison sentences is one of general deterrence 
brought about by ex-prisoners who return to their communities and 
communicate the aversiveness of long prison sentences. While this 
premise requires verification by empirical studies, current research 
suggests that ex-convicts are not conveying this message. 
IV.  SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE 
The previous discussion has challenged the possibility of 
reducing crime rates by increasing the severity of punishment—
one of the three “levers” that the Benthamite formulation of 
deterrence calculus makes available to policymakers. The second 
“lever”—the perceived delay between committing the offense and 
receiving the (highly uncertain) punishment for the offense—is 
                                                          
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
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perceived as being less relevant in our adversarial system. There is 
reason to believe, however, that the third “lever”—the probability 
that the offense will be detected—can be used to produce 
considerable progress toward incremental deterrence. Put plainly, 
drunk driver campaigns work to stop drunk driving. When 
publicized police campaigns to catch drunk drivers are put in 
place, the threat of arrest, broadcast widely by news clips of 
inebriated drivers, results in a decrease in drunk driving. 
The probability that an offense will be detected is not perceived 
as a continuously varying probability, but as a dichotomous state. 
State one is triggered when external events do not remind the 
potential offender of the possibility of apprehension when 
committing the offense. This is the normal state for many potential 
offenders. State two is triggered when the possibility of being 
apprehended is brought to mind, provoked by some stimulus, such 
as the sighting of a police car. 
One factor that may radically alter the individual’s calculation 
of the odds of apprehension is the sudden induction of what is 
called the “objective,” or “outside observer’s,” perspective on the 
individual’s own actions and thinking. For example, the sight of a 
police car on the side of the road causes a driver to assume an 
observer’s perspective (specifically, that of the police) with respect 
to the speed at which he is driving. The probability that an offense 
will be detected is one determinant of the deterrence calculus, but 
it may not be the case that a potential offender has a stable, 
continuously accessible estimate of his chances of being caught. 
Instead, events in the external world may provoke, for some 
interval, a heightened estimate of the chances of getting caught. 
This may explain the frequent occurrence of deterrence campaigns 
that work by publicizing large increases in police surveillance of 
areas in which the targeted crime is to be deterred. Drunk driving 
campaigns, with television news reports of police checkpoints at 
which people leaving bars are likely to pass, are one such example. 
The psychological process is this: triggered by a television report 
or by seeing an actual checkpoint, persons otherwise prone to drink 
and drive are made vividly aware of the possibility of being 
caught. This is likely not represented as a probability, but rather as 
a chance weighing of the probability of punishment, the severity of 
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punishment, and the expected delay before the punishment, against 
the expected gains of committing the crime. If the possibility of 
being caught is called to the potential offender’s attention, the 
crime is not committed. On this account, if the chances of being 
caught for committing an offense are made vivid, lessening the 
severity of the punishment for that offense should not increase the 
rate of the crime in question. 
Some evidence supports this claim. Campaigns in which police 
conduct well-publicized efforts to target a certain offense and 
make the police presence apparent often succeed.25 These 
campaigns have often been “crackdowns on drunk driving” 
campaigns, in which the police presence near places where alcohol 
is consumed, often on nights when heavy drinking is expected, is 
conspicuously present.26 
Thus, in contrast to attempts to reduce crime rates by 
increasing the severity of the sentence for the crime, campaigns 
that make salient in the mind of the public the possibility of being 
caught for committing the offense are often successful. The 
salience-raising account also predicts what is often observed, 
which is that, as the detection campaign ends, the specific 
instantiation of the deterrent presence tends to fade in the memory 
of individuals and crime rates return to previous levels. 
In summary, the monetary and social costs of long duration 
prison sentences are high. Examining the deterrence effectiveness 
of those sentences causes skepticism about their utility: many who 
commit crimes show no evidence of thinking at all about the future 
punishments that might await them. For others, thought processes 
are sufficiently impaired by alcohol or drugs, such that they are 
also unlikely to be daunted by the vague possibility of punishment 
inflicted far in the future. Others, even corporate criminals, become 
enmeshed in criminal actions in ways that make them not 
contemplate the possibility of punishment for actions that they do 
not consider criminal. Recent research on the punitive weight of 
long duration sentences suggests that these sentences are less 
                                                          
25 H. LAURENCE ROSS, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY 
FOR SAVING LIVES 69-72 (Yale University Press 1992). 
26 Id. at 24. 
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punitive than advocates of long duration sentences consider them 
to be. These are likely to be among the reasons that sentencing 
duration increases generally show no reduction in crime rates when 
aggregated effect studies are done. 
V. WHAT CITIZENS SEEK FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The stereotype of the moment is that citizens want “to be tough 
on crime,” and this is generally interpreted as a desire for long 
duration prison sentences in prisons that “are not country clubs.” In 
fact, this may be a perception that politicians encourage citizens to 
hold when they confront citizens with prototypes of criminals who 
commit vicious, cold-blooded crimes. There is also anecdotal 
evidence, however, that citizens express other perceptions when 
they are presented with cases of other types of crimes. As an 
example, Californians were surprised when they learned that the 
three strikes law had resulted in a life sentence for a petty thief 
who had stolen a few slices of pizza. To these observers, this 
sentence seemed to be too severe and not what they had in mind 
when supporting the three strikes law. As this example suggests, 
citizens have a concept of an appropriate sentence and feel that 
some sentences are far too strict to be appropriate. 
Together with Professors Paul Robinson and Kevin Carlsmith, 
I have conducted a number of studies designed to determine the 
sentences that citizens deem appropriate for various crimes and, 
more importantly, to determine what citizens consider to be the 
relevant purposes of those sentences. Our evidence supports what 
the example above suggests—that people seek to impose a 
sentence that comports with what the offender justly deserves for 
the crime committed. To determine the sentence, people seek out 
information about the “moral weight” of the offense. For example, 
did the person embezzle money? Then they seek to know the use to 
which the embezzled money was put. Was it used to continue a life 
of debauchery? If so, then they are morally outraged and conclude 
that the sentence imposed should be severe. If, however, the 
money was used to afford a child a life-saving operation, their 
outrage is much reduced and so is the sentence. After seeking a 
good deal of information relevant to just deserts, the participants in 
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our studies sought information relevant to whether the offender 
was likely to recidivate, and adjusted sentences accordingly. Thus, 
once the first goal of appropriately punishing the offender was 
satisfied, the participants had a second goal of incapacitating 
potential repeat offenders. The participants did not seek 
information relevant to the question of whether a sentence would 
serve the purpose of general deterrence.27 
A conceptually similar set of experiments was conducted in 
which a person was given the task of reading a scenario about a 
crime that an offender committed and assigning a prison sentence 
to that offender. The scenario contained some details that would be 
informative to a person contemplating just deserts considerations 
as well as details that would be informative to a person holding a 
deterrence or incapacitation perspective. The experimental 
question was, “Which details actually influenced the sentencing 
decision?” Participants in one study used the just deserts 
information to determine appropriate sentences and made no 
discernable use of the incapacitation information.28 In the other 
study, participants also used the just deserts information, but did 
not use the deterrence-relevant information. 29 
Based on these studies, we suggest that people generally 
employ a just deserts perspective when determining the sentence 
they would give to a specific offender for a described crime. Stated 
a bit more narrowly, the task of determining the punishment justly 
deserved by an offender is one that draws heavily on just deserts 
considerations, relatively little on incapacitative considerations, 
and, as far as we can tell, not at all on deterrence considerations. 
This does not mean that if we inform persons that some serious 
crime has a rapidly rising rate of occurrence they will not conclude 
                                                          
27 Kevin Merrill Carlsmith, Why do we Punish? Retribution, Deterrence, 
and Incapacitation as Motives for Punishment (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Psychology, Princeton University) (on file with 
author). 
28 J.M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000). 
29 Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why do we Punish? Deterrence and Just 
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 
292, 295 (2002). 
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that the sentence for the crime should be increased. Nor does it 
mean that if we ask citizens about whether they would like their 
legislators to vote in favor of a “three strikes law” they will say 
“no.” What these studies do suggest is that respondents will react 
negatively if they hear about a specific sentence that they consider 
too strict. For example, if they are told about a case in which some 
poor misfit is sentenced to life after a third crime involving the 
receipt of $127 under false pretenses, respondents will think that 
the sentence is inappropriate.30 
CONCLUSION 
During the past several decades, there has been a remarkable 
increase in prison sentences for most existing crimes. Particularly 
in the area of “drug-related” crimes, there has been a shift toward 
converting minor “possession” offenses into more serious crimes. 
As a result, the population of people in prison has greatly 
increased. The goal of those mandating increases in sentence 
severity has been to deter potential offenders from committing 
crimes. But a review of the evidence on the effectiveness of these 
crime prevention practices reveals that they are not producing their 
desired effects. Accepting this conclusion, which continues to gain 
support, we asked why, from a psychological perspective, severity 
increases were not effectively reducing crime rates. We then 
considered whether deterrence could ever serve as an effective 
crime control strategy. We concluded that deterrence could be 
effective if the probabilities of detection and apprehension were 
greater in the mind of the potential offender at the time he felt the 
impulse to commit the offense. We then addressed the question of 
whether the public has demanded the policy of increasing sentence 
severity. 
Our research suggests that it is not the case that citizens’ 
                                                          
30 For a narrative of the history of the three strikes law in California, with 
stories of citizens who have come to oppose the law because of its tendency to 
assign what are essentially life sentences for the third commission of a rather 
minor offense by a desperate person, see JOE DOMANICK, CRUEL JUSTICE: 
THREE STRIKES AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA’S GOLDEN STATE 
(University of California Press 2004). 
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implacable demands for ever-increasing prison sentences create an 
impassable barrier to considering alternative ways of dealing with 
criminal offenders. While it lies beyond the scope of this article to 
suggest what those alternatives might be, thoughtful observers31 of 
our criminal justice system have made several proposals, a number 
of which have been adopted in Europe with some evidence of 
success. 
 
                                                          
31 See MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT A CRIME: SENSE AND 
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (Oxford University Press 2004); 
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY (Oxford University Press 2003); ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: WHY THE SOLUTIONS TO AMERICA’S MOST 
STUBBORN SOCIAL CRISIS HAVE NOT WORKED—AND WHAT WILL (Henry Holt 
and Company 1998). 
